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COMMENT
THE DOCTRINE OF ENTRAPMENT AND ITS APPLICATION
IN TEXAS

The problem of whether a person who has committed an unlawful act may escape culpability on the grounds that he was
induced or solicited to perpetrate the act by another has been the
subject of much discussion and comment. The question that perpetually arises when the topic of entrapment is discussed or raised
as a defense in a criminal prosecution, is one of a moral nature;
viz. the legitimate detection of crime, or the illegitimate creation
of it for the sole purpose of punishing the unsuspecting guilty.
The Supreme Court of the United States decided this question
in the now famous Sorrels case which has become the recognized
authority on the subject. Since some twenty odd years have passed
from the time that case was decided, it is the purpose of this
article to review the decision of the Sorrels case, its background,
and show the effect it has had on the present day status of the
doctrine in the various jurisdictions, and in particular, Texas.
Historical Background
In order to facilitate a better understanding of the doctrine of
entrapment a brief reference must be made to its origin and history. Prior to World War I, the defense of entrapment was restricted for the most part to those crimes where the criminality
of the act was affected by the question of consent. In these cases,
the want of consent was an essential element to the particular
crime, such as robbery,' burglary,2 larceny,8 or receiving stolen
property,4 and the fact that consent was provided would in itself
negate the guilt of the accused.'
Since these cases do not properly belong in a discussion of the
doctrine of entrapment, for in reality they are decided on the
issue of consent, no further consideration will be given to them.
1 Connor v. People, 18 Colo. 373, 33 P. 159 (1893).
2 Bird v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 96, 90 S. W. 651 (1905).
s Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 109 N. W. 1037 (1906).
4 People v. Jaffe, 185 N. Y. 497, 78 N. E. 169 (1906).
5 For a more complete discussion of these cases, see 18 A.L.R. 143, 149; Beale,
The Borderland of Larceny, 6 HARV. L. REv. 244, 245 (1893) ; and 76 U. PA. L. REv. 873
(1928).
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Entrapment, in its modern connotation, may be said to have
stemmed from the case of Woo Wai v. United States.6 Further
development of the defense was prompted by the great amount
of police legislation passed during the 1920's and 30's, such as
the narcotic and liquor laws, where unlawful acts were easily hidden and detection of them rendered more difficult. Judge Woodrough said in 1927, "As shown by the last report of the Attorney
General there were some 44,000 liquor prosecutions brought in
the federal courts during the fiscal year, and I may estimate the
proportion of them that are based on sales to agents (prohibition
officers) by the cases brought before me, it would seem that at least
30,000 of them are of that kind." 7 It was from this legislation
that cases such as United States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicatting Liquor,' Casey v. United States,9 and Sorrels v United States1"
arose. The present day concept of the defense of entrapment has
developed from these cases.
A number of cases involving the actions of detectives and the
use of decoys in the apprehension of persons suspected of, or
actually engaged in, violations of the law have arisen. These cases
are closely allied to the topic of entrapment and have been compiled in several articles."
Rationale and Scope
The defense of entrapment in its early state of development
took a wide variety of forms and tests. The Woo Wai case was
one of the first cases to decide that a defendant was entitled to
an acquittal solely on the grounds of entrapment. The court rea6 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), where a confidential agent of the Immigration Commission suspected Woo Wai, a Chinese merchant in San Francisco, possessed certain
information regarding the unlawful importation of Chinese women into San Francisco.
The agent conceived a scheme whereby a private detective was hired to approach Woo
Wai with the proposition of bringing Chinese unlawfully into the country across the
Mexican border, in order that Woo Wai would be caught and any information he knew,
extracted from him. Despite long protests on his part, he was finally induced to bring
a number of Chinese into the country for which he was apprehended, tried, and convicted. The Circuit Court held the acts of the officers to be a clear case of entrapment
for which no criminal liability would attach to Woo Wai.
7 United States v. Washington, 20 F. 2d 160, 161 (D. Neb. 1927).
8 290 F. 824 (D. N.H. 1923).
p276 U. S.413 (1928) ; see, 2 So. CAL. L. REv. 287, 291 (1928).
10287 U. S. 435 (1932) ; see, 41 YALE L. J. 1249 (1932).
11 See, 29 HARV. L. REv. 100 (1915) (detectives); and 20 COLUM. L. REV. 598
(1920), (use of decoys).
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soned in this case that it was against public policy for an agent
of the government to lure an otherwise innocent person into the
commission of a crime. This public policy was described as that
of "denying the criminality of those who are thus induced to
commit acts which infringe the letter of criminal statutes."12
Following the Woo Wai case, the defense of entrapment was
used to a great extent in the vast amount of criminal litigation
instituted under the police legislation previously referred to. A
wide variety of procedural devices and rationale were employed
by the courts in deciding these cases. Judge Learned Hand, commenting on this fact in United States v. Becker, said, " decisions
are plentiful, but the judges generally content themselves with
deciding the case upon the evidence before them; we have been
unable to extract from them any definite doctrine, and it seems
unprofitable once more merely to catalogue the citations."1 Some
of the decisions seem to be based on an extension of the civil law
doctrine of estoppel, whereby the government was estopped by
the conduct of its agents from prosecuting the defendant. 4 in
other cases, it was held that the government would be prevented
from pursuing the prosecution of an entrapped defendant and the
case should be dismissed at any stage of the proceedings.
Despite the fact that these decisions were varied and inconsistent in the procedures and theories used in reaching their conclusions, a concept emerged from these cases which has been referred to as the "doctrine of entrapment." The phenomenal growth
of this so called "doctrine," which had no established procedure
or theory at this time, can best be attributed to a feeling of moral
indignation on the part of the judges who decided these cases.
This "doctrine" was said to be based on a public policy that
estopped or enjoined the government from prosecuting persons
who had been the victims of its agents. The idea of a private citizen being placed on trial because he was induced to commit an
unlawful act by a law enforcement official shocked the conscience
of the courts. Judge Sanborn stated the feeling of the courts when
223 F. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915).
13 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2nd Cir. 1933).
12

14 United

States v. Lynch, 256 F. 983 (S.D. N.Y. 1918).

Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) ; and United States v. Pappagoda, 288 F. 214 (D. Conn. 1923).
15
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he wrote, "The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent,
not to punish crime. It is not their duty to incite to and create
16
crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it.'
The Supreme Court of the United States had the opportunity
to clarify its position on the matter when the case of Casey v.
United States came before it. However, the Court avoided the
issue in deciding the case and only Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a
dissenting opinion, mentioned the fact that the case should have
been decided on this point. 7 It was not until 1932 that the Court
was again afforded the opportunity to determine the validity of
the "doctrine," propose a theory for it, and establish a procedure
for its application. The case that presented this opportunity was
the celebrated Sorrels case.' Unfortunately, not only did the
Court fail to unite in a decision that would establish some definite procedure and rationale for the defense, but even disagreed
as to the existence of the so called "doctrine."
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in speaking for a majority of the
Court, reversed and remanded the case. He stated, "We are of
the opinion that upon the evidence produced in the instant case
the defense of entrapment was available and the trial court was
in error in holding that as a matter of law there was no entrapment, and in refusing to submit the issue to the jury."' 9
The Court based its decision on the premise that Congress, in
enacting the National Prohibition Act, did not intend the Act to
apply to cases in which the sale was instigated by a prohibition
agent for the purpose of luring an otherwise innocent person to
the commission of a crime in order that he might be arrested and
punished. It went on to say that the defense of entrapment can
not be attributed to any power in the Court to grant immunity
16 Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921).
17

276 U. S. 413, 425 (1928).

18 Cited supra, in this case a prohibition agent visited the defendant's home with

three other men, one of whom was a friend of the defendant. The agent after a conversation asked the defendant if he could get some liquor to which the defendant replied he could not. After further conversation it was brought out that both the agent
and the defendant had been in the same army division in World War I and shortly
thereafter the defendant went out and returned with some liquor which he sold to the
agent for five dollars. The defendant was indicated and tried for the illegal possession
and sale of liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The district court judge
ruled as a "matter of law" that there was no entrapment, and a jury verdict which followed found the defendant guilty. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
19 2 8 7 U. S. 435, 452 (1932).
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or defeat prosecution when a penal statute has been violated, as
these powers are vested in the executive branch of the government; but rather it depends upon the scope of the statute alleged
to have been violated.
In short, the majority opinion completely rejected the "doctrine of entrapment" and stated that as a defense, entrapment
could only be used when the statute, under which the defendant
is being tried, can be construed as not to be applicable to the particular fact situation.
A separate opinion, written by Mr. Justice Roberts, concurred
as to result but not as to reason. In his opinion, the Justice stated,
"The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental rule of public policy.
The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the
purity of its own temple belong only to the court. It is the province
of the court alone to protect itself and the government from such
prostitution of the criminal law."2 The opinion then went on to
say that once proof of entrapment is presented to the court, the
prosecution must stop, the indictment quashed, and the case dismissed. 2
In this opinion, one observes the "doctrine of entrapment" as
it was established on the principle of estoppel. The basis for the
difference in the two opinions seems to be a conflict in views on
the policy-making authority as related to the administration of
the penal laws. The majority opinion indicates that the legislative branch of the government has the power to create offenses
and defenses and the judiciary must stay within the limits of
statutory interpretation in administering these laws. The concurring opinion, on the other hand, will concede that the legislative
branch can create criminal laws and grant immunity from them
by statutes, but it maintains that the judiciary has the right to
"over-see" this process while administering these laws; and if it
finds a situation exists which the legislature did not contemplate,
then it is the duty and right of the judiciary to "clean its own
house."
As a result of these conflicting theories, the procedural ramifi20 287
21 For

U. S. 435, 457 (1932).
a discussion of the Sorrels case, see, Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment
in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1941) ; 8 So. CAL. L. REV. 246 (1935);
46 HAV. L. REv. 848 (1933) ; and 81 U. PA. L. REV. 1001 (1933).
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cations are great and totally different. The majority opinion provides that the defense should be put in issue as a question of fact
at such time the defendant is called upon to make his defense;
whereas, the concurring opinion permits the accused to raise
the issue as a question of law before the case goes to trial, thereby
preventing the prosecution of the case. Because of this procedural
difference, Justice Roberts contends that under his view, the accused is never permitted to be tried for a crime he did not commit, while the majority opinion grants immunity to a person who
is in fact guilty. The Justice further contends that under his
theory the accused is granted an unwarranted defense, while the
majority of the Court grants immunity to a guilty person, which
power is not within the province of the court.
It would seem that the majority opinion presents the better
view in that it is the function of the legislature to define public
policy.22 Since this proposition has been firmly established over
a long period of years, it would not be within the realm of the
judiciary, as Mr. Justice Roberts advocates, to set aside a public
policy established by the Congress; nor would it be within the
province of the court to decide that Congress has declared no
public policy on the subject and then proceed to declare one of
its own. This would transcend the power of the judiciary and
amount to judicial legislation. Therefore, the public policy theory
should be rejected and the "statutory interpretation" theory of
the majority opinion accepted.
The Sorrels case has also provided us with an excellent definition of the defense which it describes as follows: "Entrapment
is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer and his
procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the
officer." 2 From this definition we may deduce that the defense
has two elements: (1) origin of the intent in the mind of the
officer; and (2) the inducement of the defendant by the officer
to commit the act. It is essential in order to make the defense
available to the defendant that the "criminal intent" originate
22

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 565

(1911).

23287

U. S. 435, 454 (1932).
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in the mind of the officer and not in the mind of the defendant. 24
The courts have not established any particular degree of inducement or persuasion by the officer in order to make the defense
apply, but some persuasion is necessary, 25 and merely furnishing an opportunity to commit the crime is not sufficient.2 6
Some courts have placed a restriction on the application of the
defense by holding that in order for it to be available, the entrapping officers must not have had a reasonable belief that the
27
accused is about to, or was actually committing the crime. If
there is a reasonable belief by the officers, there can be no entrapment and the defense will not be allowed. This qualification
to the defense merely makes the distinction between the legitimate
detection of crime and the reprehensible practice of entrapment.
If the officers can show that they had reason to suspect the defendant, any scheme or plot used by them to apprehend is legitimate and the defense of entrapment is placed out of reach of the
defendant. This addition to the defense seems to obscure the basic
question involved, that of intent, and has not been followed in
recent cases.
Crimes to Which Entrapment Is a Defense
The distinction made at common law between crimes that are
malum in se and those that are malum prohibita has become for
the most part obsolete today. This is especially true in jurisdictions where no act is a crime unless prohibited by statute."8 Nevertheless, the distinction is still important in determining the presence or absence of a required "criminal intent" or mens rea. This
"criminal intent," or mens rea, is not easily defined and at best
can be described as, "the particular state of mind, differing in
different crimes, which, by the definition of the particular crime,
2' 9
must concur with the criminal act."
It would seem that since a "criminal intent" is required only in
Woo Wai v. United States, cited supra; United States v. Lynch, cited supra.
United States v. Pappagoda, cited supra.
See 2 So. CAL. L. REV. 288 (1928) ; and Hitchler, Entrapment as a Defense in
Criminal Cases, 42 DIcK. L. REV. 195, 199 (1938).
27 United States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquor, cited supra.
24

25
26

28 TEx. PEN. CODE (1925), art. 3.
29 MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW (1934),

Chapter 5, par. 14(b), p. 54.
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crimes malum in se that the defense would apply only to these
crimes. However, the defense has been held to apply to crimes
both malum in se"0 and malum prohibit.3 1 It has also been used
as a defense to crimes that require a "criminal intent" 2 and to
crimes that require no such intent.3 Entrapment has also been held
34 statutory crimes,35
to be a defense to common law crimes,
felonies, 6 and misdeameanors. 7
Entrapment by Persons Other Than Officers
Generally, the use of entrapment as a defense has been confined to cases in which the entrapping person is an agent of the
government. If the inducement or persuasion under which the
accused acts is provided by a person who is neither an officer of
the law, nor one acting in a representative capacity for them, the
accused cannot avail himself of the defense of entrapment.3 To
constitute entrapment, the crime must have been initiated, directly
or indirectly, by officers or agents of the government. 9 Some cases
have placed private detectives in the same position as law officers
and have allowed the defense.4" It would seem from a study of
these cases that the courts apply the defense only when the entrapping person is an officer of the law, or a person employed by them
and acting in their behalf, or in certain cases involving the use
of private detectives or investigators. The difficulty that has pre30 State v. Broadus, 315 Mo. 1279, 289 S. W. 792 (1926) ; State v. McCornisb, 59
Utah 58, 201 P. 637 (1921) ; and see 86 A.L.R. 249 for a collection of cases.
31 United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349 (D. Mont. 1913); Wilcox v. People, 17 Colo.
Ap. 109, 67 P. 343 (1902) ; see 18 A.L.R. 162 for a collection of cases; and 2 So. CAL.
L. REv. 286 (1929).
32 People v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. Ap. 498, 233 P. 816 (1924) ; Warren v. State, 35 Okla.
Cr. 430, 251 P. 101 (1926).
33 Voves v. United States, 249 F. 191 (7th Cir. 1918) ; United States v. Healy, cited
supra.
34 Sorrels v. United States, cited
supra, Justice Roberts concurring.
35 Sorrels v. United States, cited supra; People v. Lanzit, cited supra.
36 People v. Lanzit, cited supra (attempt to murder) ; State v. McCornish, cited
supra (pandering) ; Shouquette v. State, 25 Okla. Cr. 169, 219 P. 727 (1923), (bank
robbery) ; See 18 A.L.R. 189, 66 A.L.R. 506, and 86 A.L.R. 272 for collection of cases.
37 State v. Dudousat, 47 La. Ann. 977, 17 S. 685 (1895) ; and State v. Mantis, 32
Idaho 724, 187 P. 268 (1920).
38 Polski v. United States, 33 F. 2d 686 (8th Cir. 1929).
39 Polski v. United States, cited supra.
40 Shouquette v. State, cited supra; Woo Wai v. United States, cited supra; State
v. Feldman, 150 Mo. Ap. 120, 129 S. W. 998 (1910) ; see Wood, Entrapment by Public
Officers as a Defense Against Criminal Prosecution, 38 DIcK. L. REv. 191, 196 (1934)
and 23 TUL. L. Ray. 400 (1949).
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sented itself to the courts is the problem of determining when the
agent employed by the law enforcement officials or the private
investigator ceases to act in behalf of the government and becomes
a co-conspirator with the accused. Each case involving this problem
is decided on its facts and no generalization or rule can be drawn
from these cases.
Survey of the States on the Defense of Entrapment
After making a survey of the jurisdictions in the United States,
is was found that only two states have enacted statutes affecting
the subject. The Legislature of Florida passed a law in 1949 that
abolished the defense of entrapment in cases of bribery, offering
bribes, offering or accepting unauthorized compensation for the
performance or non-performance of official duties, and obtaining
or attempting to obtain certificates of registration other than the
required fee.41 The other state, Wisconsin, in its new criminal
code, which became effective July 1, 1955, drafted into the code
a section that provides for entrapment to be a defense to all
crimes.42 This appears to be the first attempt to draft a statute with
a general provision for this defense.
A further study of the case law in the various jurisdictions has
revealed that all save three states have had decisions bearing on
the subject.4" It would be purely speculative to surmise whether
the defense exists or would be followed in these states. In the
remaining jurisdictions, it was found that the federal jurisdiction,
the jurisdiction for the District of Columbia, and all but two of
the several state jurisdictions recognize entrapment as a defense
in criminal prosecutions. The two states that reject the defense
are New York and Tennessee. A list of the latest cases found in
Florida Statutes (1953), Title XLIV, Chapter 838, section 838.11.
Wisconsin Statutes (1953), Title XXXII, Chapter 339, section 399.44:
"339.44. ENTRAPMENT. The fact that the actor was induced or solicited to
commit a crime for the purpose of obtaining evidence with which to prosecute him
is a defense unless:
(1) The idea of committing the crime originated with the actor or a co-conspirator
and not with the person so soliciting its commission; or
(2) The crime was of a type which is likely to occur and recur in the course of the
actor's business or activity, and the person doing the inducing or soliciting did
not mislead the actor into believing his conduct to be lawful and did not use
undue inducement or encouragement to procure the commission of the crime."
4s No cases found in: Delaware, New Mexico, and Vermont.
41

42
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the various jurisdictions dealing with the subject has been compiled in the footnotes. 4
It is most difficult to distinguish and compare the rationale and
procedures used in these cases, and a grouping or cataloguing of
them is almost impossible. It does seem, however, that the majority
4ALABAMA, Johnson v. State, 36 Ala. Ap. 634, 61 S. 867 (1952)

ARIZONA, Hoy v. State, 53 Ariz. 440, 90 P. 2d 623 (1939)
ARKANSAS, Whittington v. State, 160 Ark. 257, 254 S. W. 532 (1923)
CALIFORNIA, People v. Jackson, 42 Cal. 2d 540, 268 P. 2d 6 (1954)
COLORADO, Reigan v. People, 120 Colo. 472, 210 P. 2d 991 (1949)
CONNECTICUT, State v. Marquandt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A. 2d 219 (1952) ; see 27
CONN. BAR J. 125.
DELAWARE, no case found
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Sherman v. United States, 36 A. 2d 556 (1944)
FLORIDA, Lashley v. State, 67 S. 2d 648 (1953)
GEORGIA, Bienert v. State, 85 Ga. Ap. 451, 69 S. E. 2d 300 (1952)
IDAHO, State v. McKeehan, 48 Idaho 112, 279 P. 616 (1929)
ILLINOIS, People v. Lewis, 285 II. Ap. 171, 1 N. E. 2d 696 (1936)
INDIANA, Ditton v. State, 221 Ind. 702, 51 N. E. 2d 356 (1943)
IOWA, State v. Heeron, 208 Iowa 1151, 226 N. W. 30 (1929)
KANSAS, State v. Leopold, 172 Kan. 371, 240 P. 2d 138 (1952)
KENTUCKY, York v. Commonwealth, 314 Ky. 445, 235 S. W. 2d 1007 (1951)
LOUISIANA, State v. Rainey, 184 La. 547, 166 S. 670 (1936)
MAINE, State v. Calanti, 142 Me. 59, 46 A. 2d 412 (1946)
MARYLAND, Ferraro v. State, 200 Md. 274, 89 A. 2d 628 (1952)
MASSACHUSETTS, Commonwealth v. Graves, 97 Mass. 114 (1867)
MICHIGAN, People v. Scaduto, 301 Mich. 700, 4 N. W. 2d 64 (1942)
MINNESOTA, State v. McKenzie, 182 Minn. 513, 235 N. W. 274 (1931)
MISSISSIPPI, French v. State, 149 Miss. 684, 115 S. 705 (1928)
MISSOURI, State, v. Varnon, 174 S. W. 2d 146 (1943)
MONTANA, State v. Snider, 111 Mont. 310, 111 P. 2d 1047 (1940)
NEBRASKA, State v. Sneff, 22 Neb. 481, 35 N. W. 219 (1887)
NEVADA, In re Davidson, 64 Nev. 514, 186 P. 2d 354 (1947)
NEW HAMPSHIRE, State v. Del Bianco, 96 N. H. 1436, 78 A. 2d 519 (1951)
NEW JERSEY, State v. Dougherty, 86 N.J.L. 525, 93 A. 98 (1915)
NEW MEXICO, no case found.
NEW YORK, People v. Schacher, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 371 (1944)
NORTH CAROLINA, State v. Love, 229 N. C. 99, 47 S. E. 2d 712 (1948)
NORTH DAKOTA, State v. Currie, 13 N. D. 665, 102 N. W. 875 (1905)
OHIO, State v. Miller, 85 Ohio Ap. 376, 88 N. E. 2d 614 (1948)
OKLAHOMA, Finley v. State, 84 Okla. Cr. 309, 181 P. 2d 849 (1947)
OREGON, State v. Hoffman, 85 Ore. 276, 166 P. 765 (1917)
PENNSYLVANIA, Commonwealth v. Kutler, 173 Pa. Super. 153, 96 A. 2d 160
(1953)
RHODE ISLAND, Tripp v. Flanigan, 10 R. I. 128 (1871)
SOUTH CAROLINA, State v. Rippey, 127 S. C. 550, 122 S. E. 397 (1924)
SOUTH DAKOTA, City of Sioux Falls v. Famestad, 71 S. D. 98, 21 N. W. 2d
693 (1946)
TENNESSEE, Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S. W. 2d 8 (1951)
TEXAS, Ivy v. State, ---------Tex. Cr------....
,277 S. W. 2d 712 (1955)
UTAH, State v. Franco, 76 Utah 202, 289 P. 100 (1930)
VERMONT, no case found.
VIRGINIA, Dorchincoz v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 33, 59 S. E. 2d 863 (1950)
WASHINGTON, City of Seattle v. Gleiser, 29 Wash. 2d 869, 189 P. 2d 967 (1948);
see 9 U. Pittsburgh L. R. 299 (1947)
WEST VIRGINIA, Taylor v. Devore, 134 W. Va. 151, 58 S. E. 2d 641 (1950)
WISCONSIN, Piper v. State, 202 Wis. 558, 231 N. W. 162 (1930)
WYOMING, State v. Kirkbride, 34 Wyo. 98, 241 P. 709 (1925)
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opinion of the Sorrels case is generally followed. However, one
case makes reference to the "doctrine of estoppel" as the basis of
the defense."
An interesting view is taken by the Colorado courts, whereby
not only is the victim of the entrapment allowed to maintain the
defense to escape criminal liability, but the entrapping officers
are guilty of a conspiracy to cause a law violation. 6 Under this
view, a wide distinction is made between detection and entrapment. Detection is classified as the testing of a suspected person
by being offered an opportunity to transgress the law in a manner
that is usual to the activity in which he is engaged, while entrapment is considered to be the instigation of crime by an officer that
the commission of which was nonexistent in the mind of the victim." The Colorado courts take the position that not only is the
act reprehensible, but it should be punished. The question of
entrapment is one of fact and is for the determination of the jury.
Review of the Texas Law on Entrapment
In Texas, the defense of entrapment has been employed over a
long period of time. It has been used as a defense to crimes involv1
50
49
ing the element of consent.48 In burglary, theft, and robbery,
if the owner of the property or his agent induces the accused to
commit the offense in order that he may be prosecuted, the inducement is held to be the equivalent of consent and the defense is
established. However, the owner of the property may employ a
person to apparently encourage a thief's design and lead him on,
provided the owner or the agent does not induce the original intent
to commit the crime on the part of the thief. 2
It is interesting to note that as early as 1879 the Texas courts
recognized the defense as existing apart from the issue of consent.58 In this case, it was held that when an officer originates the
criminal intent and apparently joins the defendant in a criminal
45 Sherman v. United States, 36 A. 556 (1944).
46
47
48

49

50
51
52

53

Reigan v. People, 120 Colo. 472, 210 P. 2d 991 (1949).
Reigan v. People, 210 P. 2d 991, 993 (1949).
Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. Cr. Ap. 156 (1887).
Bird v. State, cited supra.
Pigg v. State, 43 Tex. 108 (1874).
Tones v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 363, 88 S. W. 217 (1905).
Crowder v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 92, 96 S. W. 934 (1906).
O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. Ap. 665 (1879).
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act first suggested by the officer merely to entrap the defendant,
the case is not within the spirit of the article of the criminal code
with which he is charged and the defendant is not guilty.54 This
view is in accord with the majority opinion of the Sorrels case.
Entrapment has been raised as a defense to other crimes in which
there is no issue of consent.5 5
The question of entrapment has been raised in the Texas courts
on the theory that the person instigating the crime is an accomplice
within the meaning of the penal code.5" A man who incites and
participates in a crime for the purpose of having the perpetrator
caught and convicted, is guilty as an accomplice, even though he is
a detective or another law enforcement official.57 Under the Texas
rules of criminal procedure, the testimony of an accomplice witness must be corroborated." This procedural problem was raised
in Bush v. State5" where the court held that when a person or agent
deliberately and intentionally originated or succeeded in bringing
about a violation of the law, he becomes a particeps criminis of
that violation and when used as a witness must be corroborated.
A test that has been applied to determine whether or not corroboration is necessary is that if the prosecuting witness did not originate
the crime, or was not instrumental in its initiation, he is not an
accomplice and need not be corroborated; but when this is in
question, it is a question of fact which the court should submit to
the jury." In Davis v. State,61 where the testimony was conflicting,
it was held that the trial court should have charged the jury to the
effect that if the prosecuting witness made the first tender, he
would be an accomplice and his testimony would have to be corroborated. However, this case also held that even though the prosecuting witness was the inducing cause, the defendant would be
guilty if he tendered the bribe. Although this case seems to be in
54 O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. Ap. 665, 668 (1879).

55 Minter v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. 634, 159 S. W. 287 (1913) bribery; Bush v. State,
68 Tex. Cr. 299, 151 S. W. 554 (1912) violation of liquor laws; Savage v. State, 75
Tex. Cr. 213, 170 S. W. 730 (1914) offering bribe; Gaines v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 212,
78 S.
W. 1076 (1904) gaming.
56
TEx. PrN. CODE (1925), art. 70.
57 Dever v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 396, 30 S. W. 1071 (1895) ; Davis v. State, 70 Tex. Cr.
524, 158 S. W. 288 (1913).
58 Tax. CODE CR. PRo. (1925), art. 718.
59 68 Tex. Cr. 299, 151 S. W. 554 (1912).
60 Savage v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. 213, 170 S. W. 730 (1914).
e' 70 Tex. Cr. 524, 158 S. W. 288 (1913).
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conflict with the great weight of authority, it should be noted that
in cases of bribery or attempting to bribe the courts have been
hesitant in allowing the defense. The reason for this is that both
of these offenses prejudicially affect the morals of the community
more so than any other crime. This view is well founded because
the highest standards of morality must be expected of civic officials
in order to preserve the proper functioning of the government.
Recent cases have dealt with the problem of whether or not the
defense has been sufficiently raised by the evidence to constitute
a question of fact. The court has held that where there is no evidence of a transpiring between the prosecuting witness and the
defendant to commit the crime, the trial court is correct in refusing
to instruct the jury as to corroboration of an accomplice witness'
testimony.62 The trial court is equally justified in not giving this
instruction if the evidence shows that the prosecuting witness was
not a part of the alleged plot or scheme.68 However, if there is any
doubt as to this question, it sould be submitted to the jury. If
the evidence reveals that the defendant may be acting as an agent
of the entrapping persons, this issue should be submitted to the
jury as a question of fact.64 Where the facts clearly indicate there
is no entrapment, a special charge as to entrapment should not be
submitted to the jury.65
The most recent case involving the issue of entrapment disallowed the defense on the grounds that it was not raised by the
evidence. In Ivy v. State,6 the Court of Criminal Appeals held
62 Stevens v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. 333, 110 S. W. 2d 906 (1937) ; Woolridge v. State,
133 Tex. Cr. 386, 111 S. W. 2d 248 (1937) ; and Humphrey v. State, 152 Tex. Cr. 203,
212 S. W. 2d 159 (1948).
63 Peery v. State, 138 Tex. Cr. 155, 134 S. W. 2d 283 (1939).
64 Scott v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. 57, 153 S. W. 871 (1913).
65 Cliff v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. 340, 162 S. W. 2d 712 (1942) ; Dabney v. State, 159
Tex. Cr. 495, 265 S. W. 2d 603 (1954); and Ridinger v. State, 146 Tex. Cr. 286, 174
S. W. 2d 319 (1943).
66 ---.-.-.---Tex. Cr -------------277 S. W. 2d 712 (1955), where the defendant was convicted for the unlawful sale of narcotics on the testimony of one Richards, a narcotic
agent of the state. Officer Richards testified that he employed one Bayly to act as an
informer for him in ferreting out law violators and that said Bayly was under his direction and supervision. The officer further testified that he had no reason to believe that
the defendant was a law breaker or that he would be at the informant's home when
he called there. The defendant testified that Bayly suggested that he (defendant)
put $25 in a joint fund with which Bayly purchased the narcotics. Defendant also
testified that Bayly suggested that the sale be made to the officer whom Bayly represented
as a friend of his and that he (Bayly) could not make the sale because he owed the
prospective purchaser a debt which said purchaser would expect the narcotics to be
payment thereof.
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that the trial court was not in error in refusing to submit to the
jury a charge on entrapment because the testimony of the prosecuting witness was uncontradicted in so far that it showed that
he was not a party to the scheme. This majority opinion then proceeded to quote from Ridinger v. State,67 in which the court said,
"It would be rather difficult to conceive of a state of facts whereby
a party was, by entrapment, induced to make a sale of liquor,
where he does so by his own acts and with full knowledge of what
he is doing."6 What the court neglected to include from that
opinion was the next sentence which states, "At any rate, the law
of entrapment is not involved in the remotest degree by the facts
of the case before us." 9 Unfortunately, in both the Ridinger and
Ivy cases the court does not seem to be aware of the Sorrels case.
Despite this fact, the conclusion reached in the Ridinger case is
correct in that the officer testified that he saw the defendant sell
a pint of liquid to a soldier which he thought to be alcohol, shortly
before he asked the defendant to sell him some. There was no
evidence that the officer provided any encouragement or persuasion
to induce the sale, which facts are unlike those in the Ivy case.
Judge Morrison, in his dissent to the Ivy case, pointed out that
the majority opinion holds that the entrapping person must be the
officer himself, which permits him to do indirectly what he is not
allowed to do directly. He then observed that it was immaterial
whether the officer knew all the details of his informants' plot, but
the real question was whether or not the defendant was entrapped
by the officer or his agent and this issue should have been submitted to the jury.
The dissenting opinion's critism is justified. Although the
majority opinion appears to decide this case on the point of evidence, the court fails to recognize the problem of substantive law
that rests therein; viz. that the informant was in fact employed by
the officer, as indicated by the officer's testimony. This places the
informant in the position of being an agent of the officer and in
view of existing case law on the point, the defense of entrapment
could properly be put in issue.
The only real question in the case, then, is presented by the
67

146 Tex. Cr. 286, 174 S. W. 2d 319 (1943).

68 Ivy v. State, supra note 66, at 714.
69 Ridinger v. State, 174 S. W. 2d 319, 320 (1943).
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testimony of the defendant to the effect that the informant was the
one who suggested the scheme and purchased the narcotics. This
testimony raised the question of intent, which is a question of fact
to be determined by the jury. Judge Woodley, in his opinion
denying the motion for rehearing, states, "We disclaim any intent
to hold that a defense to crime may not be raised by the testimony
of the defendant." 7 However, the court's decision, in its practical
effect, does the very thing it disclaims to do. Ivy v. State illustrates
the danger that the defense may be relegated to a position of
unused legal theory because the courts submerge the defense in
a mire of adjective law that is misapplied through misunderstandings of the basic principles of the defense.
Conclusion
The defense of entrapment has become a confused and uncertain theory in Texas. This is due to the fact that the Texas courts
have adopted the procedural device that the entrapping person is
an accomplice and his testimony must be corroborated. This approach to the problem is unreal because in most of the cases the
entrapping person not only advises and encourages the accused
before the crime is committed, but actually participates in the
act. It is a pure fiction to consider such a witness as an accomplice, for under the article of the penal code that defines accomplices,71 an accomplice is one who advises, commands, or encourages another to commit a crime before the act is done, but who is
not present at the time the act is committed. Under this view, no
real defense is provided for the defendant but an extra burden
of proof is placed upon the State. If the State can provide the
necessary corroborating testimony, the defendant is convicted even
though it was proved that the witness placed the intent to perpetrate the act in the mind of the defendant. The only instance
in which the defendant may be acquitted is when the State cannot provide the necessary corroboration.
The doctrine of entrapment, free from such procedural fictions,
is a desirable defense in the proper administration of the penal
laws as it serves as a deterrent to over-zealous law enforcement
70

Ivy v. State, supra note 66, at 716.

71 TEx. PPEN.

CODE, (1925),

Art. 70.
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officials. The "statutory interpretation" theory, as expressed in the
majority opinion of the Sorrels and O'Brien cases, provides the
better approach to the problem. Under this theory, the defense
should consist of two elements: (1) origin of the intent in the
mind of the officer; and (2) some inducement or persuasion by
the officer to the accused to commit the act. This defense should
be limited to fact situations where the entrapping person is an
officer of the law or an agent acting in his behalf. The defense
should be made available to all crimes with the exception of
bribery and attempting to bribe. In this aspect, the Florida statute
and the views expressed in Davis v. State are desirable in order
to maintain high standards of morality in our public officials.
The best way to clarify the defense and overrule the conflicting
case law on the subject would be for the legislature to enact an
article in the penal code describing the defense and providing for
its use. Such an article may be patterned after the provision in the
Wisconsin Penal Code for the defense. The need for such legislation has long been realized in Texas. Judge Davidson said in
1913, "We here call the attention of the Legislature to such matters and would suggest that appropriate legislation be enacted to
prevent matters of this sort occurring." 2 It would seem that after
forty-two years of this warning the time for such legislation is
long overdue.
Richard S. Whitesell, Jr.
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Scott v. State, 153 S. W. 871, 872 (1913).

